On June 12, 2025, the U.S. Supreme Court rendered a unanimous decision in Rivers v. Guerrero (605 U. S. ____ (2025)) that aligns with the position advanced by Beck Redden associate Anson Fung and partner Owen McGovern in the amicus brief they authored on behalf of U.S. Senator John Cornyn.

The Court held that a second-in-time federal habeas petition qualifies as “second or successive” under AEDPA once the district court enters judgment on the first petition, regardless of whether an appeal is pending.

In so holding, the Court reaffirmed the fundamental distinction between Rule 59(e) motions to alter or amend the judgment and motions for relief from a final judgment filed under Rule 60(b): “[U]nlike a Rule 60(b) motion for relief from judgment, which seeks to challenge an extant judgment, a successful Rule 59(e) motion merely suspends finality of the original judgment so that the district court can fix any mistakes and thereby perfect its judgment before a possible appeal.” Slip Op. at 9 (quotations omitted).

Further, the Court declined to entertain Rivers’s assertion “that second-in-time filings that request amendment of the initial habeas petition under Rule 15 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do not—by their nature—qualify as second or successive filings under §2244(b).” Slip Op. at 12. As amici explained, allowing Rivers to proceed on such a novel theory not only contradicts the plain text of the rules, but also affirmatively undermines the finality of judgments by eliminating the ability of litigants to rely upon the “safeguards” of finality set forth in Rules 59 and 60, which govern all civil litigation in federal courts across the country.

This decision underscores the importance of procedural finality in post-conviction litigation and will have a significant impact on federal habeas practice and general civil litigation by reinforcing the well-settled understanding of Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 59 and 60.